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ADDRESSES

THE MORAL DELEGITIMIZATION OF LAW
RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS*

The title that I suggested for this address is: "The Moral
Delegitimization of Law." Of course this title presupposes
something which cannot readily be presupposed today. Something that cannot be taken for granted but indeed must be
argued for quite explicitly-there is a need for the moral legitimation of law. Obviously the very idea of legitimation assumes
something that is external to that which is to be legitimated.
That is, aside from the most abstract level of discussions of the
first principles, nothing is self-legitimate.
Law does not and cannot stand on its own feet, especially
in this kind of society. It cannot stand by itself, and yet a very
long history in American jurisprudential argument suggests
precisely that. Whether under the banner of positivism or varieties of realism, the basic proposition put forth is that talk
about the moral legitimacy of law is nonsense on stilts. The law
is the law is the law.
I suggest that this does not make philosophical sense. It is
counter-intuitive, and it is contrary to our historical experience.
Finally, such a proposition is not sustainable in a society that
professes to be legitimated by a theory of democratic
governments.
Now if one talks about what it is that can legitimate the law,
some resort immediately to another law. They employ various
terms such as a higher law, a natural law, or a fundamental law.
All such terms presuppose that we live in a moral universe; not,
of course, in the sense that people behave morally, or even in
the sense that the non-human aspects of the universe behave in
a morally approvable manner. Rather, a moral universe in the
sense that life itself is an engagement that has consequences for
good or evil-right or wrong-and that human beings in par*
Director, the Center on Religion & Society. This text is adapted from
an address given to the Notre Dame Community, April 7, 1988, as part of the
Thomas J. White Center Lecture Series.
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ticular are moral agents. My own belief is that there are enormous resources as yet undeveloped, certainly undeveloped in
terms of their public articulation in a persuasive manner, in the
natural law tradition, or, perhaps more accurately, the natural
law traditions.
Father James Burtchaell, here at Notre Dame, has recently
written a paper for us at the Center in New York for a conference we are doing on what I call "The Return of Eugenics." It
has a very interesting excursus on why natural law language is
resisted in our culture. He suggests in part, and I think it is a
suggestion worth pondering, that it is the word law that meets
with such resistance. Natural should not be the problem, he
says. 1
The last twenty years has shown an enormous resurgence
in the perception of the importance of the natural. In particular, one thinks of the environmental movement and ecological
concerns. There is an awareness that things have certain connections of a causal nature built into the way they are. If these
connections are disregarded or violated, very unhappy consequences will result. I think it is possible to develop this insight,
in a way that I find intriguing, with respect to our understanding of law as a part of a moral universe. Now were I to pursue
this in an explicitly Christian context, I would certainly find
myself sympathetic to the insights of Romans, Chapter 1, for
example.2 Some call this natural theology, but I think that a
misnomer. More accurately, it is an awareness of a divine creative source, end, and purpose universally available to all persons of reason. To develop that awareness in an explicitly
Christian sense is terribly important. However, the subject at
hand is the question of the delegitimization of law in American
society. In any event, given certain perverse understandings of
the religion clause of the first amendment, many people would
consider it not only an unfruitful line of inquiry, but one
outside the legitimate discussion of law in the public arena
because it is obviously "tainted" by religion.
Does the answer to the legitimation question finally come
down to one that will inescapably be religious in character?
Yes, I think so. At least if one is using the term religious in a
more sociological frame of reference and speaking of religion
1. SeeJ. BURTCHAELL, THE GIVING AND TAKING OF LIFE: ESSAYS ETHICAL
ch. 5 (1989) (forthcoming, Univ. of Notre Dame Press).
2. "For since the creation of the world his invisible attributes are clearly
seen-his everlasting power also and divinity-being understood through the
things that are made." Romans 1: 20.
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as a functional phenomenon, namely, as that which is binding
in terms of a set of ideas and beliefs in a society, civilization, or
tradition. I, along with Paul Tillich and a host of others, agree
that politics, including law, is in the largest part a function of
culture and that at the heart of culture is religion. I think it
important we see the movement from law, to politics, to culture, to religion. At the heart of this is the question of religion
as religere, as that which has the binding force.
It is not easy to make this argument today, for many think
any reference to religion is in the service of the obscure. But
the understanding I propose is, I think, well embedded in
ordered liberty-the American experiment, this democratic
republican or republican democratic form of governance. It is
the understanding shared, it seems to me, by the founders,
including some of those who were viewed as being least sympathetic to traditional religions such as Jefferson, who himself was
an exception within the community of the founders.
Today, this understanding has become very strange to a
world ofjurisprudence that subscribes to various forms of realism which I think are aptly described by the term "crackpot
realism." That realism is deeply unrealistic. It believes that the
law is the law is the law and seems to think that this notion is
capable of sustaining this American experiment in ordered liberty. I do not think it is. I do not think any historical evidence
exists to suggest that it is. On the contrary, it seems to me
many of those who advocate what I take as a rather cynical view
of the law and who would not consider the question of the
moral legitimacy of the law are operating on deeply anti-democratic impulses. They are strongly out of sympathy with the
notion of democratic theory and sovereignty resting with "we
the people."
Of course, one can be cynical about the capacity of a realistic view sustained in a manner that would muddle us on
through. It is a little like Gibbon's remark about religion and
the Roman Empire. There were many religions in the Roman
Empire, he noted. To the common people they were equally
true; to the philosophers, equally false; and, to the rulers
equally useful. 3 It seems to me a great deal of current thinking
about law is exactly that way. However, even this kind of thinking indicates a readiness to make a token gesture toward the
validity of the question concerning the moral legitimacy of law.
3. 1 E. GIBBON, DECLINE
(H. Milman ed. 1883).

AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE,

ch. 2,

at
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By contrast, philosopher Richard Rorty endorses what he
frankly calls, a bazaar of pluralistic choices in American life.4 I
cite Rorty because he is particularly candid and lucid in setting
forth what is presupposed in the writing and minds of many
other people. We must relentlessly refuse to ask the question
about moral legitimacy, says Rorty, except within our private
enclaves-what he calls our contemporary equivalents to the
English gentleman's club. He argues that it is not only possible
but it is imperative to exclude those questions from public
deliberation. I consider this position to be a refusal to engage
in the whole civilizational tradition of law and morality in the
politics of which we are part.
I find this position, as exemplified by Rorty, a rejection of
politics because I believe that Aristotle rightly defined politics,
including law, when he said that the political question is how
ought we to order our life together.5 That is, politics is an
extension of ethics. It is the process in which rational persons
(he said men) engage one another in civil discourse around the
question of how ought we to order our life together. Yet, this
is inescapably a moral question, as the single word ought indicates. What is the good and the right, such that when law and
politics are in its service, it is then legitimate morally? And
when law and politics undermine that good, that right, then
such politics and law are delegitimated.
In our time people such as Rorty view themselves,
strangely enough, as being in the lineage of people like John
Dewey. They call themselves pragmatists in the Deweyan tradition. I find this rather astonishing, for John Dewey, however
misguided in much of his thinking, shared a very profound
understanding of the need for the moral legitimation of law,
especially in a democratic society. In 1934, you recall, he published his little book, A Common Faith. It seems to me it was
flawed but well directed. It was aimed at doing what many
thoughtful Americans, in this century and before, have
attempted to do: to provide something like a public philosophy
which would at least offer a common vocabulary and a shared
vision to allow conflicting answers and discordant questions to
be discussed within the bonds of civility and rationality. The
trouble with John Dewey's Common Faith, of course, is that it
was not common. It was essentially the faith of John Dewey
and a few other products of an elite, non-representative slice of
4. See generally R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE
(1979).
5. See generally ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. I, ch. 2.
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American culture. However, this common faith, which he
thought would displace the traditional faiths he viewed as riddled with superstitions and irrationalities, was nonetheless a
serious and noble effort to try to reconstitute a common
conversation.
Not-so-incidentally that effort today has been most confused and agitated in the realm of education, especially -public
education. People in education who, interestingly enough,
claim Dewey as one of their patron saints have abandoned
Dewey's effort almost entirely. Having found it difficult, they
have declared it futile even to attempt. Thus we have, particularly in the public school classroom, a frequently self-conscious
and systematic abandonment of the central task of education
itself, a failure to transmit to another generation the constituting visions by which a society answers the question, "How
ought we to order our life together?"
We have descended not only in the public school classroom, but in the public square generally to a kind of possessive
individualism. It is a purely procedural and sterile understanding of law and of politics, divorced from a culture that is itself
increasingly divorced from its religious grounding. It is a law
and a politics incapable of asking the question: "How ought we
to order our life together?" because there is no reference, no
point of discussion which gives meaning to the "ought." Thus
the ought is dismissed, if not as meaningless, then as capable of
being given meaningful answers only in the personal and private sphere, hermetically sealed off to keep from disrupting our
public business in a way that might lead to impassioned conflicts over conflicting moralities, and maybe even to religious
warfare. An old clich6 sums this up: we cannot deal with moral
judgments and values in public because we are a pluralistic and
democratic society. Raise a question concerning public morality, and the objection immediately comes: "Whose morality or
whose values will be imposed upon whom?"
These cliches that invite us to abdicate the task of moral
deliberation in public are really a rejection of politics as such.
They certainly are a rejection of politics as defined in this democratic experiment. In this experiment it was understood, at
least in theory, that sovereignty or legitimacy is borne by "we
the people." The founders were quite explicit (even Jefferson,
and especially the older Jefferson) about the impossibility of
this kind of polity, this kind of social experiment, without a radical dependence upon public virtue and public virtue's radical
dependence, in turn, upon religion.
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The daring thing-it seems to me one could say the single
most daring thing in the American experiment and that which
makes it truly an experiment-is that the founders said that the
foundation of the state, that is, public virtue, is beyond the purview and control of the state. The state has no business to control or define that upon which the whole experiment is
premised. This, I think, was without precedent in all human
history. This daring to disaggregate the political, the culture,
and the religious continues to be highly experimental. It
assumes that a state, by letting that which it admits to being
foundational out of its control, is acknowledging its very limited character. I take it as a substantive statement, not merely
rhetoric, that in the pledge of allegiance we say "one nation
under God." Although only added in 1954 during the McCarthy era, and although it upset many who assume it means a
nation somehow specially chosen or exempt from the sins and
the corruptions of other powers, I take it to mean that ours is a
nation accountable to God. "Under God" means, first of all,
under judgment. This is what the founders, some explicitly
and others intuitively, meant by the relinquishing of governmental control over that public virtue and its religious ground.
I think this was in our history as a society, fleshed out and
articulated most majestically and persuasively by Abraham Lincoln both in his ponderings of the ambiguities of providential
purpose in human history and his bringing together the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution as one corpus, as
one constituting statement for the continuing experiment.
Now there are those who would say all that is interesting
and historically sound. Indeed there was this grounding in
public virtue, which was in turn grounded in religious belief
and behavior. But, they maintain, this is not the America of
today. The America of today, we are told, is increasingly secular and pluralistic. I, however, would say that neither of those
claims are true, nor are they supported by empirical evidence.
In the last forty to fifty years it seems we have become the
opposite of a pluralistic society in the conduct of our public
business, in our public deliberation, and in our decision making. We have become a society of monism which has increasingly excluded the most significant diversities in American
life-those differences over how we answer the question:
"How ought we to order our life together?" Our society is not
a pluralistic society. It is for pluralism that we need to contend.
True pluralism is not pretending that our differences make no
difference, but true pluralism is engaging the differences that
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make most difference within the bond of civility. We need to
restore pluralism in American life.
This is, far from being secular America, a society incorrigibly and increasingly religious in character.6 Whether one is
skeptical or even cynical about the religiousness of the American people (and we should at least be skeptical about it), one
must acknowledge the political significance of the fact that with
few exceptions the American people-"we the people" againprofess to believe that morality is derived from religion. The
question is asked, "What is the source of morality?" The
answer, from eighty-five to ninety percent of the American people, is religious in character. That is, they will answer the Bible
is the source of morality or the Ten Commandments, the teachings of the Church, the Sermon on the Mount, or the Torah.
We may be very skeptical, and indeed should be, about how
real the knowledge of Scripture is or even whether people are
able to name three of the Ten Commandments. But sociologically, and in terms of our understanding of democratic legitimacy, their answers are a matter of enormous import. Religion
is increasingly, not decreasingly, perceived to be the source of
moral legitimacy. To rule religion out of order in our public
deliberations, including our jurisprudence, is indeed to throw
down the gauntlet to the entire democratic proposition. Those
who would rule it out of order must, it seems to me, be challenged as to whether they are not taking a position that is fundamentally and in principle opposed to this way of structuring
a society in ordered liberty.
It is quite possible, of course, to construct morality and
schemes of moral judgment and ethical deliberation from
sources other than religion or at least from sources other than
what are traditionally identified as religious sources. We all
know that. Certainly it is possible to be a morally exemplary
person without reference to what is ordinarily perceived or
described as religion. The curiosity in American life is that
even those who recognize the need for the moral legitimation
of the political order, including its law, often tend to seek some
source other than the source acknowledged by "we the people." One thinks, for example, of John Rawls and his Theory of
Justice. That book may not accurately reflect Rawls' position
today, but it nonetheless remains an exceedingly useful point
6. I recommend a book that we did at the Center, Unsecular Amenca
(Eerdmaus 1987). It brings together most of the data, I think, of the last 40
to 50 years that we have with respect to secularity and religiousity in
American life.
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of reference for constructing a notion of justice. Justice is the
primary public virtue from which other public virtues are
derived. But Rawls attempts to construct a notion of justice
without reference to any community, its history, its traditions
its mores, its aspirations and hopes. This is to construct an
ethic on the premise, quite precisely, of selfishness and ignorance. The basic theory about the "original position" in Rawls
has the persons deliberating totally ignorant of their particular
life situation, their historical placement, their interests, their
bonds of loyalty, affection or happiness. Indeed, they are
totally ignorant of themselves. It is not really radically individualistic because it destroys even the individual. These individuals behind this "veil of ignorance," which constitutes the
"original position," ask only one question, a totally selfish
question: What is in my interest, given the contingencies I cannot know or control? Rawls, it is fair to say, in terms of the
discussion of public morality in American intellectual life, has
written the single most studied, remarked upon, debated book
of the last twenty years. And it is premised upon this construction of reality which I find surreal, quite frankly. Even if one
found it persuasive, it clearly rejects in most unmistakable
terms the notion of the founders of this experiment in ordered
liberty.
All this leads inevitably to what is the single most fevered
and egregious instance of the abandonment of Aristotle's
understanding of politics in recent jurisprudence-Roe v. Wade,
the 1973 abortion decision.7 As John Noonan and others have
pointed out, perhaps for the first time in Western jurisprudence, the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that
constitute a civilization are explicitly excluded from consideration on a question of great public moment. I think the question
before the Court was about as elementary a political question,
indeed a prepolitical question, as one can imagine. The question was: Who belongs to the community for which we accept
common responsibility? Who is the "we"? And how do we
exclude some from the "we" of the "we the people" without,
by the same criteria, excluding many others whom we may not
wish to exclude? In biblical language the question was, "Who
is my neighbor?"
InJustice Blackmun's opinion, in Roe v. Wade, this question
was to be addressed without reference to the constituting
moral traditions, including religious and philosophical traditions, of Western civilization and of this American experiment.
7.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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This does not mean, of course, that moral judgments will not
be made, only that moral judgments will be made by default.
These are moral judgments that dare not speak their name as
moral judgments. These are moral judgments about the primacy of privacy and the role of technology and power in the
disposition of life that is inescapably (by any criteria rational or
scientific) part of the continuum of humanity. Blackmun's reason for why these other considerations could not be taken into
account was that the moralists and theologians and philosophers do not agree on this question of life and when it begins.
I always found this a particularly amusing reason because you
similarly might have ruled out constitutional law since constitutional lawyers obviously do not agree. (There are many who
would say that indeed Justice Blackmun did rule constitutional
law out of order in that particular case.)
Roe v. Wade has already shown itself to be the portent of
many things to come, and many more are coming at us hot and
fast. Under the guise of "technological breakthrough," we are
confronted with questions of the care and the non-care of
human life, and indeed of the extinction of human lives. In the
guise of technological breakthrough, but actually representing
cultural and moral breakdowns, we are witnessing a return of
eugenics. Eugenics suffered, I believe, only a momentary
pause after the horrors of the Third Reich. People who are
enthusiastic about the return to eugenics now refer to the Holocaust and the eugenic policies of Hitler as being excessive or
extreme or unbalanced. Seldom do they ask of what principle
is it the extreme.
I am not sure that today, and certainly not in the world of
American law, we have the capacity, even if we had the will, to
respond with a firm, persuasive, and effective "No" to the
things now being done and being proposed. One thinks of the
farming and harvesting of fetuses, and, inescapably, more than
fetuses are involved. The development of new criteria in a
"quality of life index" will extend such grotesque notions as
wrongful life to serve legally-sanctioned programs of involuntary euthanasia. On Tuesdays and Thursdays it is very easy to
despair, but I think that we have not the right to despair. When
we consider current confusions in the understanding of politics, morality, and law, it seems apt to describe our moment-in
Allan Bloom's happy phrase about our unhappy state-as one
of debonair nihilism or "nihilism without the abyss." '
8.

A.

BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND

155 (1987).
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What should our response be? Among other things, we
have to challenge very emphatically what I call the Pfefferian
inversion of the first amendment. I refer, of course, to Leo
Pfeffer, a person for whom I have great admiration, but whom I
think was quite wrong-headed. He says he is unapologetically,
and always has been, an "absolutist" with regard to strict separation. His notion of democracy is comprised of an absolutist
on one side and an absolutist on the other. These two then
have at one another, and from this conflict emerges something
like an approximation of truth and justice. Pfeffer has suggested that the reason he won again and again is that the absolutists on the other side weren't there when they should have
been. They were trying to accommodate him.
The Pfefferian inversion, of course, is to turn the first
amendment religion clause (and I would insist that it is indeed
one two-part clause) upon its head. This inversion only happened in the last forty to fifty years. So completely has it happened that people even refer to the clause today simply as "the
establishment clause." I would argue that, historically and logically, the entire purpose of the religion clause is to protect the
free exercise of religion. Why is the no-establishment clause
even there? Because the establishment of religion would violate the free exercise of religion. The establishment clause
serves the free exercise clause. It makes no internal sense
unless one simply happens to be an anti-clericalist who loves
no establishment for its own joys. The logic of no establishment, the logic of the debates in Congress, all point to no
establishment as serving free exercise. But this understanding
has been turned on its head so completely that in Laurence
Tribe's much used text in constitutional law he says it is possible to carve out from the establishment clause a "permissible
zone of accommodation" for the free exercise of religion.9 The
founders would not feel terribly grateful to Professor Tribe for
allowing a permissible zone of accommodation for that which
was their entire purpose to begin with, namely, the free exercise of religion. This is the Pfefferian inversion.
Any interpretation of the no-establishment provision that
violates or inhibits free exercise is a misinterpretation. Obviously this understanding of the religion clause is not the one
that has prevailed for the last several decades of American
jurisprudence, and maybe it is not the one that will prevail in
the future. I, however, think it is one worth contending for.
9.
1988).

L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 14-4, at 1169 (2d ed.
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Law is a function of politics; politics, a function of culture; and,
culture, a function of religion. All are required if we are truly
to engage in that exercise of asking and arguing with one
another over how we ought to order our life together.

